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AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN
ADMIRALTY*
G. H. ROBINSON
I
THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF ADmRALTY LAW
Admiralty law is a body of concepts, international in character like
"international law" itself, or the "law merchant", which, like them,
has its special history, both in and outside of our Anglo-American
"law". In this general and international sense, admiralty law has its
roots in a more remote past than other branches of our law. It has
also its own classic expositions, its ancient codes and usages; and no
discussion of the immediate topic of present day admiralty law in
America can be entered upon without considering this ancient and
international background.
The writings which embody this common tradition of the law of the
seas; the admiralty classics, so called, are guide posts in man's efforts
to subject the wide waters to his uses. Set down by different peoples,
they record the rise and fall and succession of sea empire. If the enter-
prising Phoenicians of the eastern end of the Mediterranean left a
code it has not come down to us. But that of another eastern Mediter-
ranean seafaring people, the Rhodians, is constantly referred to as
the earliest, dated at about 9oo B.C. It is often stated to have become
the basis of the sea law of Greece, and of Rome, when those ancient
lands entered upon maritime ventures.1 An authoritative admiralty
lawyer has denied, however, that there was a Rhodian code, or that
it was ever adopted into the Roman law.2 He, like Justice Story,3
asserts that in both particulars the legend is based on a spurious work
dated no earlier than about 15oo A.D.; and insists that the maritime
law of Rome is to be credited to the Roman jurisconsults. At any
rate the Roman law or civil law influence on the admiralty is large,
*The material published here will constitute the first three chapters of a
HoRNBOoK ON ADMIRALTY.
'See an article Admiralty Law by judge A. C. Coxe, long an admiralty specialist
in the United States District of Southern New York, in (x9O8) 8 COL. L. Rav. 172,
177.
2R. D. Benedict, The Historical Position of the Rhodian Law (19o9) 18 YALE
L. J. 223.
'Story's Literature of the Maritime Law (18I8) is at p. 93 of his MIsCELLANEOUS
WRITINGs edited by W. W. STORY (Boston, 1854).
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particularly in the procedure and in the absence of the lay element,
the jury, at trial.4
Another "code" included among the admiralty classics is that of
Oleron, which has greatly affected both the modern European and
Anglo-American admiralty. Oleron is an island off ancient Guienne,
now and for centuries in France, but the laws were promulgated by
Eleanor, Henry the Second's queen, mother of Richard the Lion of
England, who was Duchess of Guienne. Richard introduced the code to
England.5 In 1896 this code still had standing in England. In that
year an English judge remarked in the course of his opinion :6 "If...
we examine the sources of the English law, as, for instance the laws
of Oleron, Wisbuy, and others . . . " The "others" included what he
called that "most valuable and remarkable code known as the Ordi-
nance of Louis XIV of August, 1681."
Of this French work, an American admiralty judge7 said that the
laws of Oleron "formed the bases of the celebrated ordinance of Louis
XIV, and are admitted in England and America as authority." He
continued: "Next in importance may be cited the laws of Wisbuy.
Wisbuy was the ancient capital of Gothland, an island in the Baltic
Sea ... The magistrates of the city had jurisdiction or rather the
arbitrament of all causes or suits relating to sea affairs. Their ordi-
nances were submitted to in all such cases and .passed for just at all
the ports of Europe from Muscovy to the Mediterranean. These laws,
which some contend, are more ancient than the laws of Oleron, are
quoted today in the admiralty courts of this country, and the maritime
codes of many countries of Europe have been based on them.
"Another celebrated code of sea laws was established by the Hanse,
or 'League' towns . . .Though to a great extent a reenactment of
what had existed before, the laws of the Hanse Towns are still quoted
with respect in the admiralty tribunals of the world.
"These three codes, the laws of Oleron, the laws of Wisbuy, and
the laws of the Hanse Towns are the most important of the ancient
codes . . .They are the three arches upon which rests the modem
admiralty structure."
Mention should also be made of the Consolat del Mar which was
4The point is discussed in a later chapter of the intended book.
5An English text of the code is to be found in SAYRE's CASES ON ADMIRALTY
(1929) p. r; in PETER'S ADMIRALTY, Appendix III; and in 3o Fed. Cas. I 17r.
6Lord Esher in The Gas Float Whitton, [r896] Prob. Div. 42,47.
7Coxe, D. J.
$See (i9o8) 8 COL. L. REv. at p. 172, and again at 178: translations of the
various codes are to be found in Appendix to PETER'S AimiRALTY DECISIONS,
Vol. I and also Vol. II.
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put into print at Barcelona in 1494 by an editor who, "Moved by the
sight of many corrupt readings" determined, "upon consultation with
shipmasters and merchants" to collate various prior versions of what
were the accepted customs among the shipmen of the Mediterranean.
In England, as one author puts it, beside "'the received' law of the
sea, embodied in the old codes", there were (other) writings upon
admiralty law which were accessible for professional use prior to the
first English book.9 But although the records of the Admiralty Court
in England run back to 1530, it was not until i59o that William Wel-
wod published his Sea Law of Scotland, the first British work.
Since this "weake piece of labour", as Welwod himself called it,
other British books have become classics. Selden's Mare Clausum
of 1635, Godolphin's View of the Admiralty Jurisdiction, second edi-
tion 1685, give the development of the admiralty law in England.
Volumes 6 (1892) and 11 (1897) of the Selden Society Publications
with introductions by R. G. Marsden 0 are valuable to the student of
the history of the subject. A birdseye view of English admiralty
history is that of T. L. Mears." Of late there has been considerable
activity in working at the history and sources of the admiralty both
in this country and in England. The labors of the late Judge C. M.
Hough, himself a great maritime lawyer, and others, have presented
the maritime activities of the admiralty judges of our American
colonies.1 2
Yet this body of international maritime "law", however much there,
is unity in its tradition, is scarcely to be conceived of as a system
which a cou-t is under mandate to follow. For our own tribunals,
Mr. Justice Holmes puts the matter in a somewhat belligerent fashion:
"In deciding this question we must realize that however ancient may
be the traditions of the maritime law, however diverse the sources
from which it has been drawn, it derives its whole power in this
country from its having been accepted and adopted by the United
States", and, obeying the urge to phrase making, he added: "There is
no mystic overlaw to which even the United States must bow.' 3 An
eminent practitioner reminds the judge that "There is, however, a
very plain and definite law, to which even the United States must
9W. Senior, Early Writers on Maritime Law (1921) 37 L. Q. REV. 323.
10Author of COLLISION AT SEA, a standard work.
"Printed as an introductory chapter of the third edition of RoscoE, ADMIRALTY
JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE (London, 1903); the same material is to be found in 2
SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, 312-364 (1908).12See infra note 20.
"
3Majority opinion in The Western Maid, 257 U. S. 419, 432, 42 Sup. Ct. 159,
66 L. ed. 299 (1922).
AMERICAN ADMIRALTY
bow if it is to succeed in maritime affairs, and that is the general mari-
time law, or common law of the sea and the established practices and
requirements of the business.' 4 An earlier judge of our Supreme
Court put the problem more sympathetically to the obvious advan-
tages of conformity with the rest of the world:
"Undoubtedly no single nation can change the law of the sea. That
law is of universal obligation and no statute of one or two nations can
create obligations for the world. Like all the laws of nations, it rests
upon the common consent of civilized communities. It is of force, not
because it was prescribed by any superior power but because it has
been generally accepted as a rule of conduct. Whatever may have been
its origin whether in the usages of navigation, or in the ordinances
of maritime states, or in both it has become the law of the sea only
by the concurrent sanction of those nations who may be said to con-
stitute the commercial world."'5 The subject is thus reminiscent of
the ancient question: "How far is 'international law' law?"1 and of
14G. L. Canfield, Note (1922) 20 MICH. L. Rxv. 535.
15Justice Strong in The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170, 187, 188, 2o L. ed. 822 (1872).
See also in the same vein: Norwich Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. 104, 2o L. ed. 585
(1872); The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 572, 578, 22 L. ed. 654 (1874); The Scot-
land, 105 U. S. 24, 26 L. ed. iooi (1881); and The Manhanset, D. C. 18 Fed. 918,
920-23 (D. C. Va. 1884).
16Bradley J. in The Lottawanna, 88 U. S. 558, 572, 22 L. ed. 654 (1874): "But
it is hardly necessary to argue that the maritime law is only so far operative as
law in any country as it is adopted by the laws and usages of that country. In this
respect it is like international law or the laws of war, which have the effect of law
in no country any further than they are accepted and received as such; or, like
the case of the civil law, which forms the basis of most European laws, but which
has the force of law in each state only so far as it is adopted therein, and with such
modifications as are deemed expedient. The adoption of the common law by the
several States of this Union also presents an analogous case. It is the basis of all
the State laws; but is modified as each sees fit. Perhaps the maritime law is more
uniformly followed by commercial nations than the civil and common laws are
by those who use them. But, like those laws, however fixed, definite, and beneficial
the theoretical code of maritime law may be, it can have only so far the effect of
law in any country as it is permitted to have. But the actual maritime law can
hardly be said to have a fixed and definite form as to all the subjects which may be
embraced within its scope. Whilst it is true that the great mass of maritime law
is the same in all commercial countries, yet, in each country, peculiarities exist
either as to some of the rules, or in the mode of enforcing them. Especially is this
the case on the outside boundaries of the law, where it comes in contact with, or
shades off into the local or municipal law of the particular country and affects
only its own merchants or people in their relations to each other. Whereas, in
matters affecting the stranger or foreigner, the commonly received law of the
whole commercial world is more assiduously observed-as, in justice, it should be.
No one doubts that every nation may adopt its own maritime code. France may
adopt one; England another; the United States a third; still, the convenience of
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the query which is raised in any case where a forum is asked to vindi-
cate "rights" based on occurrences which take place beyond the con-
fines- of the territorial boundaries of the court's sovereign. In this
latter question the court relies on "comity".17 Why any nation ac-
cepts the common customs. of the sea rests on no less or greater basis.
They exist as law in the courts of any nation only as that nation has
adopted them.
The United States has adopted the customrary law of the sea
with modifications of its own
Among the British colonies in North America, there had been ad-
miralty courts in the seaport cities since 1696. In 1768 new Vice
Admiralty courts were set up at Halifax, Boston, Philadelphia, and
Charleston.'8 Commissions to these various colonial judges bestowed
wide authority to deal with both specified and general maritime mat-
ters.1 9 Activities of the various admiralty judges who sat in New York
in the pre-Revolutionary period have been preserved to us by the
labors of the late Judge Hough.2 0 As Hough shows in his Introduc-
tion, the New York court had special significance. He says that it is
quite erroneous to believe that what the court did was righteously
"snuffed out" by the Revolution. On the contrary, its practice, self-
the commercial world, bound together, as it is, by mutual relations of trade and
intercourse, demands that, in all essential things wherein those relations bring
them in contact, there should be a uniform law founded on natural reason and
justice. Hence the adoption by all commercial nations (our own included) of the
general maritime law as the basis and groundwork of all their maritime regula-
tions. But no nation regards itself as precluded from making occasional modifica-
tions suited to its locality and the genius of its own people and institutions, espe-
cially in matters that are of merely local and municipal consequence and do not
affect other nations."
17H. Barry, Comity (1926) 12 VA. L. REV. 353; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1927) P. 7; I BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) p. 53.18H. Putnam, How tie Federal Courts Were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction (1925)
10 CORNELL L. Q. 460,461.
"The text of one of these is set forth in I BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY PRACTICE
(5th ed. 1925) 660.
20REPORTS OF CASES IN THE VICE ADMIRALTY OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW YORK
AND IN THE COURT OF ADMIRALTY OF TEE STATE OF NEW YORK, 1715-1788 (Yale
Univ. Press, 1925). Judge Hough, at p. 257, n. A. shows that there is very little
of what he calls "admiralty remains", either in New England or in Nova Scotia
whence tradition says they were taken when Boston was evacuated; or in Phila-
delphia, or in Charleston.
See also HELEN J. CRUMP, COLONIAL ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION IN THE SEVEN-
TEENTH CENTURY (London, 1932), who states that the admiralty work of Massa-
chusetts was done by the ordinary courts.
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created as it was, has widely passed on to all the courts of the United
States. This early court handled the substantive law with little regard
to the English admiralty of the time and, says Judge Hough, "there-
fore produced beneficial results through the United States courts,
which took up the work in the same spirit."
The admiralty clause of the United States Constitution
Notwithstanding this considerable background of local contact with
the subject of maritime law, it received scanty advance attention in
the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787.21 Although by the end
of the year 1778 admiralty courts had been set up in all of the thir-
teen states, and the Continental Congress had organized a committee
to hear appeals in prize cases, none of the original "plans" for the
Constitutional Convention mentioned the topic, and the wording of
the Constitution on this point appears to have been the work of the
"Committee on Detail" which hammered the various plans into final
shape.
22
However the language got into the Constitution of the United
States, the starting point for the student of American admiralty is
with that document. Its Article III, section i provides that "The
judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish . . . Section 2. The judicial power shall
extend... to all cases of admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction." Al-
though a century and a half later a judge said that the purpose of the
framers of the Constitution was to place the entire subject under
national control,23 the articles which specifically say so concerning
other subjects are differently and more explicitly worded. Article i,
section 8 reads that "Congress shall have power to regulate" inter-
state and foreign commerce, etc.24 Early maritime legislation merely
used the word "cognizance" of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,25
21Though in 1924, Judge Van Devanter said "The framers of the Constitution
were familiar with" it. See Panama R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 44 Sup.
Ct. 391, 68 L. ed. 748 (1924).
22See Judge Putnam's discussion of this point in (1925) IO CORNELL L. Q. 461
el seq. The present text is based on his refutation of Justice Wayne's statement
in Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441 (1846) that the present wording of the Constitu-
tion was in the "first plan". Wayne, J. extensively discusses the sources of our
admiralty law.
23Van Devanter, J. in Panama R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 44 Sup. Ct.
391, 68 L. ed. 748 (1924).24The italics are the writer's.
nAct of Sept. 24, 1789, I STAT. 76, R. S. §711, 28 U. S. C. A. §371 (JUD. CODE
§256) grants the cognizance to the District Courts.
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and literally this mere setting off of judicial power in admiralty was
scarcely a grant to Congress of legislative authority over the subject
matter. Yet Congress has actually proceeded as if it had been given a
grant of power and it has actually exercised over matters maritime
an authority equivalent in practice to that which it exercises over
interstate commerce. This assumption or usurpation has not escaped
comment.2 6 But judicial acquiescence in the Congressional view of
the latter's authority has been frequent. In 1924 the Supreme Court
said: "Although containing no express grant of legislative power over
the substantive law, the provision was regarded from the beginning
as implicitly investing such power in the United States. Commentators
took that view. Congress acted upon it, and the courts, including this
court, gave effect to it."2 7 The same opinion continued in like vein
to the conclusion that there was "power" in Congress over the entire
subject. And in a more recent case,28 the Supreme Court holds that
the effect upon state laws of Congressional legislation in the admiralty
field is the same as Congressional legislation under the grant of
"power" over interstate commerce. This was again asserted in 1934
in what no doubt is the definitive statement of the doctrine. Speaking
in a period of federal ascendancy in other particulars, Chief Justice
Hughes for the court said: "The purpose was to place the entire
subject, including its substantive as well as its procedural features
under national control. From the beginning the grant was regarded
as implicitly investing legislative power for that purpose in the United
States."28 a Thus Congressional power where judicial power was ex-
tended is complete.
Whatever may be the actual type of cases included in the phrase
"all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"--of which more
later-the general admiralty and maritime field is therefore confided
by the United States Constitution to the Federal Government, not
merely judicially but legislatively as well. As the custodian of the
substantive law so labeled, the Federal Government, rather than the
states or any one of them, is to say what shall be recognized as the
"general maritime law" in the first instance.29 The job of saying what
was what early fell to the Federal courts and until comparatively
26See (I919) 33 HARv. L. REV. 300.27Van Devanter, J. in Panama R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375,44 Sup. Ct.
391, 68 L. ed. 748, (1924).
28Lindgren v. U. S., 281 U. S. 38, 50 Sup. Ct. 207, 74 L. ed. 686 (193o).
2'The Thomas Barlum (Detroit Trust Co. v. Barlum S. S. Co.), 293 U. S. 21,
55 Sup. Ct. 31, 79 L. ed. 36 (I934).
"
9This of course is Mr. Justice Holmes' view, supra note 13, applied to state
and federal relations.
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lately in the field of "maritime law" legislation was scanty.30 In the
large sections of the leading texts and case books which are devoted
to "maritime jurisdiction", the material consists of Supreme Court
decisions on what cases were and were not within the meaning of the
Constitution's phrase. Moreover this judicial construction building up
a content for the language of the Constitution was at a time when the
Supreme Court was building up its job generally. Taking the English
meanings of the words at the time of the Revolution as a standard,
the court's connotations of these constitutional phrases have been as
widely extended as any other in the document. The early process,
indeed, was wholly that of extension. That the words of the Constitu-
tion are in any sense a limitation on the Federal Government's author-
ity over the field has been an idea of the last quarter century and is
the product of judicial decision on the legislative activities of Con-
gress in the maritime field. In this sense the expansion of admiralty
jurisdiction has in recent years met with checks and its progression
has been less triumphant in the twentieth century than in the nine-
teenth. These limitations, however, have been read as part of the
relationship between the Federal Government and the states, and the
problem involved has been wholly internal.
In so far as our relations with other nations are concerned, the
internally appropriate authority to conduct them is the Federal Gov-
ernment. The United States as an international personality may adopt
or reject such portions of the international maritime corpus 3' as it
chooses so long as it is prepared to accept the cost of being out of step
with other maritime nations. Its treaty power extends to the making
of conventions which limit what is otherwise generally accepted ad-
miralty law:32 and the Congressional power to legislate is no less
30C. M. Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction of Late Years (1924) 37 HARV. L. REV.
529. "On the vital point of expounding the constitutional grant, and ascertaining
and declaring what are and what are not 'cases of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction', that Court for more than a century has pursued its own method of selec-
tion and exclusion choosing what seemed suitable from the whole range of mari-
time laws (or customs) whether English, continental or colonial sometimes
throwing away its first choice, but authoritatively labelling its excerpts for the
time being as the maritime law of the United States."
3tThat there is "Corpus Juris maris" is repudiated by Holmes, J. He calls it
"not a corpus juris (but) a very limited body of customs and ordinances of the
sea". So. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 220-21 (1917), dissenting opinion.
-In The Albergen, 223 Fed. 443 (S. D. Ga., 1915), an American citizen sued in
admiralty for wages due him from a Dutch vessel, and the court held that a
treaty granting exclusive jurisdiction to the consuls of the Netherlands barred the
suit. Seea note in (1916) 29 HARv. L. REV. 219. 2 MOORE, DIGEST INTERNATIONAL
LAw (19o6) p. 278ff, gives instances of renunciation of control over foreign vessels,
etc. in American harbors. The general subject of consular jurisdiction is fully
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unbounded in this particular field. However the change involves the
Federal Government's political department in diplomatic controver-
sies, the courts do not question the treaty any more than they question
the legislation. 3 No self-imposed constitutional limitation rests upon
the United States in the interest of world unity of the maritime law.
The limitations of recent years though leaving Congress free to
adopt or reject within the traditional area "admiralty and maritime",
have taken the form of judicial decisions which require that its modi-
fications apply uniformly throughout the United States. Domestic
uniformity in the admiralty field has become a constitutional require-
ment which the court has hammered out with persistence since the
World War. Though not a new idea the doctrine was so sharply
stated in 1917 in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen34 that the admiralty
law of the present may be called the post-Jensen period. Much of the
older law has been affected either by the decision itself or by the
statutes 5 which Congress has passed in acceptance of the fact that
uniformity is imperative.36 The year 1920 witnessed the modification
of the Merchant Marine Act, the passage of the Federal Death Act,
the new Seaman's Act, a new Maritime Lien Act, a Ship Mortgage
Act. In that same year the Supreme Court issued new Rules of Prac-
tice in Admiralty. In 1927 Congress passed a Harbor Workers' Act
on a workmen's compensation basis. Of lesser general interest are the
Acts of 192o and of 1925 in which our government has largely ab-
dicated its sovereign immunity as a ship owner.
36a
treated in RESEARcH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1932) Part II, Legal Position and
Functions of Consuls, especially Article II. In a volume of the same title, 1929,
Part III Territorial Waters, the Research Committee discuss the position,
especially in Articles I6 et seq., of merchant ships in territorial waters.
3nThe Constitution of course makes treaties the "law" on a par with statutes.
A statute repeals a treaty so far as the courts are concerned. National courts
administer their own law as declared by Congress or other legislatures. Cf. The
Zamora, 32 T. L. R. 436 as noted in (1916) 30 HARv. L. Rv. 166.
34244 13. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 523, 61 L. ed. IO84 (1917).
,The doctrine was not really new in 1917, having been set forth in The Lotta-
wanna, 21 Wall. 558, 575 (1874), when Bradley, J. stated: "One thing, however,
is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred to a system of law coex-
tensive with and operating uniformly in, the whole country." It was possible for
Hughes, C. J., for a unanimous court, to say in the Thomas Barlum, supra note
28a, in 1934: "But the grant presupposed 'a general system of maritime law'
which was familiar to the lawyer and statesmen of the country, and contemplated
a body of law with uniform operation. The Lottawanna..."
nSee (1931) 44 HARV. L. REV. 226, n. I I, an article by the present writer.
,
6See (1931) 44 HARv. L. REV. 226, n. 9; a sketch outline of the Federal legisla-
tion based on the "grant" of "judicial power" is set forth by Hughes, C. J. in
the Thomas Barlum 293 U. S. 21, 55 Sup. Ct. 31, 38, 79 L. ed. 36 (z934).
3eaSee Responsibility of the United States on Maritime Claims Arising out of
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This activity of Congress has mirrored the revivification of a United
States Merchant Marine in which Congress itself has played a direct
and, it must be conceded, a costly part. Up to the Civil War, our ton-
nage rose steadily. Ships of the finest construction were turned out
of our yards. The "Yankee Clipper" was a factor in world trade as
the great days of sail were ending. Ashore, M. F. Maury studied winds
and currents, and afloat, great sailors drove great ships across the
waters as no ships had ever before been driven. But the switch to
steam carried sea supremacy to the British Islands and, by the out-
break of the World War, the flag which the clippers of Watson's and
McKay's building had carried was a rare sight in distant ports. The
World War called for more ships and the call took on a frantic note
as the German submarines did their work. Ship yards grew over night
and spewed ships. At vast cost the flag was at sea again and if it is
still costly to keep it there we have now a merchant marine. This
flood of new interest on the subject the writer invokes as the justi-
fication for the present work.
II
MARITIME JUr SDICTION
in dealing with American admiralty, it is customary to devote the
opening chapters to the subject of admiralty jurisdiction. "Jurisdic-
tion" is a term which has to do with two things. It means the power
to give juristic significance to events-usually those which occur
within the territory of the sovereign who is said to "have jurisdic-
tion" in this sense, to say what the legal results of the events shall be.
The phrase also means that a forum of a particular sovereign may feel
that it can appropriately give a judgment on occurrences which have
taken place anywhere. Having "jurisdiction" may here be a matter of
service, etc. The two senses are not always distinguished and they
are not always set off in discussions of jurisdiction. They are not set
off in the fundamental document in American admiralty, the Consti-
tution of the United States. But admiralty jurisdiction in the first
sense rests upon a combination of various items of which the most ob-
vious is some sort of maritime flavor in the facts constituting the sub-
ject matter of the suit. In addition, certain purely legalistic formulas,
which have to do with the forum in which the suit may or must be
brought, make up "jurisdiction" in the judicial sense. In both aspects
of jurisdiction the discussion again starts with Article III, section i
the Operation of Government Owned Vessels, comment (193o) 39 YALE L. 3.
1189-I202.
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of the United States Constitution, that "The judicial power of the
United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such in-
ferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish." Section 2 reads "The judicial power shall extend to all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Since the general context is
concerned with the setting off of the Federal establishment as against
those of the states, it might be supposed that the states and their
courts are excluded from the field. This, however, is not the fact.
Notwithstanding that the maritime field is federal both judicially
and legislatively, state authority cannot be ignored. As part of what
has turned out to be a fundamental, and, so far, permanent adjustment
of the state-federal limits, Congress in 1789 enacted 37 "That the dis-
trict courts shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . saving to suitors
in all cases the right of a common law remedy where the common law
is competent to give it." From this it does not necessarily follow that
the common law remedy should be pursuable in the state courts, as the
Federal courts themselves also administer common law remedy. But
this clause has been so interpreted as to prevent the ouster of the
state tribunals and it makes necessary as part of the question of juris-
diction an examination of what was saved to them by the phrase
"common law remedy". Briefly, and at this point only incidentally,
the state courts are denied only that remedy which appropriates the
ship herself to the indemnification of the other party-the so-called
action in rem. 38 Actions which seek personal judgments even though
based upon admiralty causes, are left to the states. For such remedies,
the plaintiff party, the libellant, in the nomenclature of the present
subject, has a choice of forum and may invoke a state court or an
admiralty court. Speaking of "jurisdiction" therefore in the sense of
court competency, the constitutional and the statutory provisionsi
amount to this: the in rem action is exclusively for the admiralty
371 STAT. 76, R. S. §7xI, 28 U. S. C. A. §371.
38"It is well settled that in an action in personam the state court has jurisdiction
to issue an auxiliary attachment against the vessel... The proceeding in rem
which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty is one essentially against
the vessel itself as the debtor or offending thing-in which the vessel itself seized
and impleaded as the defendant and is judged and sentenced accordingly. By
virtue of dominion over the thing all persons interested in it are deemed to be
parties to the suit; the decree binds all the world, and under it the property itself
passes and not merely the title or interest of a personal defendant... Actions in
personam with a concurrent attachment to afford security for the payment of a
personal judgment are in a different category." Hughes, J. in Rounds v. Clover-
port Foundry and Machine Co., 237 U. S. 303, 35 Sup. Ct. 596, 59 L. ed. 966
(19,5).
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courts, that is, the Federal District Courts of the United States sitting
in admiralty. The suit in personam may be brought either in the same
Federal courts, sitting either in admiralty or at common law :9 or in
the state courts. As New York City is the foremost American sea-
port, the bulk of admiralty litigation centers in the courts which sit
in and around New York harbor. A larger share of maritime com-
mon law remedy litigation falls to the state courts of New York than
to other states and more maritime cases fall to the Federal courts
sitting in New York City than to other Federal courts. In New York
City alone there are two United States Districts, the Southern and
the Eastern Districts for New York. In the Southern there are eight
judges and in the Eastern four. Ten Federal Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals review the decisions of the District Courts. That sitting at New
York City is the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
From the Circuit Courts of Appeals cases may go to the Supreme
Court of the United States and as the state courts are obliged by the
Federal courts' reading of the Constitution to conform to the mari-
time law uniformity doctrine there is also a review by the Supreme
Court of the United States of state court rulings on maritime law.
In so far as courts, whether state or Federal, are called upon to inter-
pret Federal legislation, their construction of its import and their
application of its provisions are also subject to its review. Conse-
quently, the United States Supreme Court sitting at Washington,
draws to itself all ultimate questions concerning the admiralty law
both statutory and non-statutory. Even in so far as that law may be
affected by treaty arrangements with foreign nations this same court
is the apex for the determination judicially if not politically of the
rights and liabilities of litigants.40 "Jurisdiction", in the sense of the
law giving juristic results to maritime occurrences, is also Federal
since the corpus juris mars is allotted by the Constitution to the
United States rather than the states. But it cannot be said that the
substantive outcome of a given suit is unaffected by the choice of a
state forum. By bringing the suit in a state court, a complaining party
,USuits on the common law side of the Federal courts are governed by the usual
requirements for Federal jurisdiction.
4"In The Appam, 243 U. S. 124, 37 Sup. Ct. 337, 6I L. ed. 633, Ann. Cas. 1917
D, 442 (1917), the Supreme Court entertained libels for the recovery of a British
ship taken by a German Cruiser at sea and by her captors brought to the United
States. Notwithstanding that the whole matter was under diplomatic negotiation
and the Germans relied on treaty provisions, the court construed the treaty for
itself and decreed restitution. See 2 HYDE, INTERNATL. LAW (1922) p. 738 for the
view that the court should have kept hands off in favor of the state department's
handling of the situation.
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may affect the "law" applicable to events maritime in character. This
is strikingly shown in the cases where the victim of a personal injury
has himself been contributorily negligent. If he sues in admiralty,
his negligence costs him only a diminution of damages, 41 but if he
sues in a New York State court, the Court of Appeals there has made
it cost him more since it applied the common law rule against him.42
What the Supreme Court of the United States thinks of this is only
inferentially to be deduced as yet, but the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals at New York in Port of New York Stevedoring Corpora-
tion v. Castagna43 in dealing with a case on its common law side said:
"The right to recover irrespective of contributory negligence is a
right, and not a matter of procedure, nor is it governed by the choice
of forum. In the case at bar, plaintiff has sought his remedy at com-
mon law to obtain redress arising out of a maritime tort. He entered
the common law court with the same right as he would have entered
the admiralty court". Since the Supreme Court refused certiorari in
the Castagna Case,44 its position on the point is merely argumenta-
tive.4 5
41The Max Morris, 137 U. S. 1, 1I Sup. Ct. 29, 34 L. ed. 586 (I89O).42Meleeny v. Standard Ship Building Co., 237 N. Y. 25o, I42 N. E. 602 (1923).
This case has been competently matched against the newer concept of the ad-
miralty corpus by George C. Sprague, Divided Damages (1928) 6 N. Y. U. L. Q.
REv. i5, who concludes that: "The true determinative question would seem to be
whether the rule of divided damage is a matter of right or a matter of procedure.
If ... of right then upon established principles it should follow the maritime tort
litigants into the common law courts." He asserts that "It is a part of the right
connected with every maritime tort and not a mere procedural remedy, dependent
upon the forum," and that "since (Belden v. Chase) the principles of the admiralty
law have been more clearly defined and established and Carlisle Packing Co. v.
Sandanger, 259 U. S. 255 (1922); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372
(I918); Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 (1917); Knickerbocker.Ice Co.
v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (192o) have been decided. The principles underlying
these cases are contrary to the decision in Belden v. Chase (i5oU. S. 674 (1893))
and it is suggested have modified it."
43280 Fed. 618, 624 (1922). 44258 U. S. 631 (1932).
45See the writer's Personal Injury in The Maritime Industry (1930) 44 HARV.
L. REv. 223, at 247 et seq. The conflict of laws doctrine assigns contributory
negligence to the "right" rather than to the "remedy". See BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAws §385; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §385, Comment C: "If by the
law of the place of the wrong contributory negligence is not a complete defense,
but reduces the amount of damages, it has the same effect if suit is brought in
another state." Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N. Y. 127, 169 N. E. 112
(1929), is specifically interesting in coming from the same court as the Meleeney
case. Fitzpatrick was injured in Ontario and the provincial statute apportioned
damages. The court said: "The act gives a right ... not recognized by the com-
mon law... [It] goes beyond a matter of procedure"; and affirmed a judgment
for the plaintiff based upon a charge in accordance with the Ontario Act. See
Note (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 1134; (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 90i.
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Cases of Admiralty-Maritime Jurisdiction
What are the factors which cause a case to fall within that corpus
of law governing the "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"? Since in
our federation scheme the residuary powers remain vested in the states,
and the Federal Government is one of limited and delegated author-
ity, the Supreme Court technique for determining into which catch
basin a given matter is to fall does not presume Federal cognizance.
It must be shown. Consequently the party invoking the admiralty ju-
risdiction must bring his case within the category of causes of "admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiction." Conversely, if the case fall under an
accepted maritime category the litigant who invokes a state court
must establish that, notwithstanding he has a maritime cause of action,
he is merely seeking a "common law remedy". These two points so
run together in the cases that they are here mentioned in the same
breath. Frequently, the definition of what is a case of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction is decided by a negation of state jurisdiction.
Construction Principles
Yet notwithstanding the foregoing there has been what might be
called a nationalistic bias in the Federal Courts in throwing the par-
ticular case into this or that pigeonhole of the maritime category.
Their development of the maritime category coincided with the period
in which the Federal Supreme Court was enlarging the Federal scope
as contrasted with that of the states and establishing its own place
among the branches of the Federal Government. Naturally enough,
in the court's reaching out for power, it often leaned its own way. In
respect to admiralty matters, the famous Justice Story in 1818 laid
down the following: "The language of the Constitution will therefore
warrant the most liberal interpretation and it may not be unfit to hold
that it had reference to that maritime jurisdiction which commercial
convenience, public policy, and national rights, have contributed to
establish with slight local differences all over Europe." 46 These factors
in our own country have made for an extension of jurisdiction which
is one of the most notable things connected with the present subject.
So far had this gone, that Justice Story's conclusion in 1818, in the
opinion last quoted that admiralty and maritime jurisdiction "com-
prises all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries", furnishes little
light without further examination of the meaning of the common
adjective "maritime".
41The quotation is from Story's famous opinion of De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall.
299, Fed. Cas. No. 3776 (I815) in which he reviews the meanings of the phrase
"admiralty and maritime jurisdiction".
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The English heritage as a test of "maritime"
The Supreme Court's attitude toward its task of reading the Con-
stitution is early illustrated by its treatment of the English tradition.
Maritime jurisdiction in our country today is little concerned with
how our English forebears handled the topic at the time the Constitu-
tion makers used their language. As early as 1815 in DeLovio v.
Boit,4 7 Story took stock of our English heritage. In the manner in
which we "adopted" the common law of England by choosing what
we felt appropriate, he elected to disregard the narrow reading of
contract jurisdiction which Lord Coke had forced upon the English
admiralty. A decision of the Supreme Court later stated: "But in
England ... the general rule (was) that the jurisdiction of the ad-
miralty was confined to the high seas and entirely excluded from trans-
actions arising on waters within the body of a county, such as rivers,
inlets, and arms of the sea as far out as the naked eye could discern
objects from shore to shore, as well as from transactions arising on
the land though relating to marine affairs. With respect to contracts
this criterion of locality was carried so far that with the exception
of cases of seamen's wages and bottomry bonds no contract was al-
lowed to be prosecuted in the admiralty unless it was made upon the
sea and was to be executed on the sea.
"Of course under such a construction of the admiralty jurisdiction
a policy of insurance executed on land would be excluded from it. But
this narrow view has not prevailed here. This court has frequently
declared and decided that the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of
the United States is not limited either by the restraining statutes or
the judicial prohibitions of England but is to be interpreted by a more
enlarged view of its essential nature and objects and with reference
to analagous jurisdiction in other countries constituting the maritime
commercial world, as well as to that of England. '48 In 1934 Chief
Justice Hughes declared: "This authority was not confined to the
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in England when the
Constitution was adopted. Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441, 457. The
limitation which had been imposed upon the high court of admiralty
in the course of its controversy with the courts of common law were
not read into the grant."49 American judicial admiralty conceptions
47Supra note 46.
"
8Mr. Justice Bradley in New England Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U. S. I,
ii Wall. I, 20 L. ed. 90 (1870). Both he and Justice Story held a marine insur-
ance to be a "contract maritime by nature regardless of the place of its execution."
The English background and our early departure from its limitations is set forth
by Nelson, J. in New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants Bank, 6 How. 344, 385
(1848). 49The Thomas Barlum, supra note 28a.
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have thus been developed according to the needs of the country as
perceived by the court, rather than by adherence to British tradition.
Our admiralty jurisdiction on the contract side is now completely
denuded of any question of where the contract was made ;50 and while
we have made our tort jurisdiction to rest on the locality of the occur-
rences, that is, upon the water, we have utterly departed from the
pre-Revolutionary English limits in defining the character of the
water. Since not only tort jurisdiction but also in some measure con-
tract jurisdiction depends on the nature of the waters, it becomes ap-
propriate to discuss our present "admiralty and maritime" jurisdic-
tion with reference to the waters involved. It can be stated in terms
of the waters upon which events must occur in order to be within the
general jurisdiction in tort. On the contract side as well as the tort
side, dealings with vessels which would undoubtedly be within the
admiralty jurisdiction if the vessels were in one body of water may
not be if they are in another, such as for instance, a land-locked lake.
Admiralty waters of the United States51
The waters upon which our admiralty jurisdiction obtains repre-
sents a comparatively early break away from the English tradition.
The English view as we have seen limited jurisdiction to the waters
of the sea or waters not within the fauces terrae within the ebb and
flow of the tide. Until the advent of the steamboat upon the western
rivers, the question whether the United States would adhere to this
remained quiescent. In 1825 Story, J. for a full court clung to the
older order,52 as he did again in 1 8 3 7 .r3 In 1847 in Waring v. Clarke54
which involved a collision on the Mississippi River ninety five miles
above New Orleans, the court took jurisdiction but was at pains55
to say that the jurisdiction "extends to tide waters, as far as the tide
flows though that may be infra comitatus." Three judges dissented
and Justice Woodbury's opinion formidably stressed the point that the
decision gave admiralty jurisdiction over territorial waters of a state.
This last was true and it has remained true ever since. In consequence
60In 66 L. R. A. 198 (igoi) Admiralty Jurisdiction of Contracts is the subject
of an extended note which is both historical and expository in character. Again
in 19o4 appears a note in 70 L. R. A. 353 on Whzat Contracts Will Support Maritime
Lien.
5 1See J. B. Waite, Admiralty Jurisdiction and State Waters (1913) n1 MICH. L.
REv. 580-87.
52The Thomas Jefferson, io Wheat 428, 6 L. ed. 358 (1825).
W'The Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, i i Peters 175, 9 L. ed. 677 (1837).
5 How. 441, 12 L. dd. 226 (1847).
5546 U. S. 44I, 5 How. 441,464, 12 L. ed. 226 (1847).
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all tidal harbors, however much they are territorial waters of a state,
are within the admiralty jurisdiction. But the latter has been extended
beyond the merely tidal waters. In 1851 The Propeller Genesee Chief
v. Fitzhugh56 litigated a collision which had occurred on Lake On-
tario. Pleading that the place of collision was within the territorial
boundaries of New York State not on the high seas nor any arm of
the sea, river, etc. where the tide ebbed and flowed, the answer sped-
fically denied admiralty jurisdiction. Chief justice Taney, having
elaborately reviewed the authorities, nevertheless retained the case.
The libellant relied upon an act of February 26, 1 84 5 57 which pro-
vided that the District Courts should have the same jurisdiction con-
cerning steamboats or other vessels of twenty tons and upward em-
ployed in navigation between lports in different states upon the lakes
and navigable waters connecting them as the courts had in case of
vessels employed upon the high seas and tide waters. The Chief jus-
tice, in holding this act to be constitutional, laid down a new test. "If
it is a public navigable water on which commerce is carried on be-
tween different states or nations the reason for the jurisdiction is
precisely the same" as in the case of tidal waters. The English rule
was phrased in terms of tide, he said, merely because the tidal stream
was the only navigable stream. "In England tide water and navigable
water are synonomous terms, and tide water ... meant nothing more
than public rivers... In other words it is confined to public navigable
rivers."5 8 In I866 The Hine5 9 involved a collision in the Mississippi
off St. Louis and of course far from the tide water on which the
Thomas Jefferson decision floated. Yet the Supreme Court upheld
the jurisdiction of admiralty against a state statute. Justice Miller
for the court stated that The Genesee Chief had established principles
upon which admiralty jurisdiction extended to all the public navigable
n51 2 How. 457, 13 L. ed. 1058 (x851). See Smith, The Genesee Chief (1923) 9
A. B. A.J. 527.
'75 STAT. 726, 28 U.S. C. A. §770. 285 U. S. 22, 52. See Crowell v. Benson, 285
U. S. 22, 55 (1931): "In amending and revising the maritime law, the Congress
cannot reach beyond the constitutional limits which are inherent in the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction. Unless the injuries to which the Act relates occur upon
the navigable waters of the United States, they fall outside that jurisdiction. Not
only is navigability itself a question of fact, as waters that are navigable in fact
are navigable in law, but, where navigability is not in dispute, the locality of the
injury, that is, whether it has occurred upon the navigable waters of the United
States, determines the existence of the congressional power to create the liability
prescribed by the statute."
"SThe tidal test was long since abolished in England. 24 VICT. c. IO (1861);
MARSDEN, COLLISIONS AT SEA, (3rd ed.) 210.
194 Wall. 555, x8 L. ed. 451 (1866).
AMERICAN ADMIRALTY
rivers of the interior of the country. He showed that the inland rivers
were not covered by the Act of 184560 which concerned only the rivers
connecting the lakes, but rested upon the original grant of power in
the Constitution which covers the entire navigable waters of the
United States.
Thus to the question, what waters are within the admiralty juris-
diction so that events occurring on them may have cognizance in ad-
miralty courts, the answer is, all waters whether fresh or salt, tidal
or non-tidal, which are navigable in fact. The test concerns the waters,
not the commerce upon them.61 To insist that the commerce upon
the waters should be interstate or foreign in order to establish the
jurisdiction is a "complete misconception of what the admiralty
jurisdiction is under the Constitution of the United States. Its juris-
diction is not limited to transportation of goods and passengers from
one state to another, or from the United States to a foreign coun-
try.262 In'so saying, Taft, C. J. was reiterating Mr. Justice Clifford
in The Belfast 63 who in 1868 said: "Difficulties attend every attempt
to define the exact limits of admiralty jurisdiction, but it cannot be
made to depend on the power of Congress to regulate commerce-... "
Again, in Ex parte Boyer,6 4 the court said: "and it makes no differ-
ence that ... one or the other of the vessels was at the time of the
collision on a voyage from one place in the state of Illinois to another
place in that state".
But though the commerce need not be interstate the waters must
not only be navigable but be navigable for interstate or foreign com-
merce. In the Daniel Ball65 it was held that the Grand River, a navi-
gable water wholly within the state of Michigan was within the ad-
miralty jurisdiction. It was a stream capable of bearing for forty miles
the Daniel Ball, a 123 ton steamer, and formed by its junction with
,
60Justice Henry B. Brown in an article on Jurisdiction of the Admiralty in
Cases of Tort (I909) 9 COL. L. REV. I at p. 2 remarks that "The validity of this
act was both upheld and denied by the Supreme Court. In the great case of the
Genesee Chief ... the power to pass the act under the commerce clause of the
Constitution was denied; but the act was recognized ... for the reason that the
Lakes and interior waters were subject to the general admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States.. ." The article discusses the further history
of the 1845 act which was described as "obsolete" in the Robt.W. Parsons, 191
U. S. 17, 31 (1903).
61justice H. B. Brown in The Robert W. Parsons, 19I U. S. 17, 26 (19o3),
lists other cases dealing with the admiralty character of various bodies of water.
"
2London Guarantee, etc. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm. 279 U. S. 109, 124,
49 Sup. Ct. 296, 73 L. ed. 632 (1929).
'37 Wall. 624,640 (1868).
'io9 U.S. 629,3 Sup. Ct. 434,27 L. ed. IO56 (1884). '5O Wall. 557 (1870).
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Lake Michigan, a continuous highway for commerce both with other
states and with foreign countries. In this opinion, the rule was broadly
announced that "those rivers must be regarded as public navigable
rivers in law which are navigable in fact" and that "they constitute
navigable waters of the United States in contradistinction from the
navigable waters of the states when they form in their ordinary condi-
tion by themselves, or by uniting with other waters a continued high-
way over which commerce is or may be carried on with other states
or foreign countries, in the customary modes in which such commerce
is conducted by water."6 6 The same principle was applied in The
Montello 67 to the Fox River in Wisconsin although its navigability
was interrupted by rapids and falls over which portages were re-
quired, and to the Chicago River in Escanaba Co. v. Chicago.68
That a waterway otherwise meeting these tests is artificial is no
bar to the jurisdiction. In 1884 in Ex Parte Boyer, 9 a writ of pro-
hibition was asked to bar an admiralty court from dealing with a col-
lision which took place in the Illinois and Lake Michigan Canal con-
necting the Chicago River with the Illinois River and the Mississippi.
Mr. Justice Blatchford denied the petition saying that this canal was
public water of the United States "even though the canal is wholly
artificial and is wholly within the body of the state and subject to its
ownership and control. ' 70 Only sixty feet wide and six feet deep, the
canal in question was built following a grant to Illinois of Federal
lands for the canal; and the Act of Congress declared that the canal
should be "a public highway". The size, or lack of size, of the canal
in the Boyer case and its financial history made theBo.yer decision
easier than that of the Robert W. Parsons7' in 1903 in which, the New
York State Courts sustained their own jurisdiction under a New
York Act to enforce a lien in rem for repairs on a canal boat navigat-
ing the Erie Canal. Arguing that such a state act was unconstitutional,
because the admiralty law applied, the boat owner sued out a writ
of error on which the Supreme Court reversed the state holding.
Justice Brown for the majority wrote that the state court's decision
was "either because the cause of action arose upon an artificial canal
or because a canal boat is not a ship or vessel contemplated by the
maritime law, and within the jurisdiction of the admiralty court". He
66io Wall. p. 563. 872o Wall. 411 (1874).
68Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 2 Sup. Ct. 185, 27 L. ed. 442 (1882).
See also Miller v. The Mayor, lO9 U. S. 385, 3 Sup. Ct. 228, 27 L. ed. 971 (1883);
Inre Garnett, 141 U. S. 1, 8, 11 Sup. Ct. 84o, 35 L. ed. 631 (1890).
69io9 U. S. 629,3 Sup. Ct. 434, 27 L. ed. Io56 (1884).
70109 U. S. p. 632.
7'19i U. S. 17, 24 Sup. Ct. 8, 48 L. ed. 73 (1903).
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held that the state court was wrong on both points; that there was no
distinction in principle between navigable waters natural and navi-
gable waters artificial. 2 He relied on Ex Parte Boyer1 3 as settling
the jurisdiction of the admiralty court over the waters of any artificial
canal74 which is the means of communication between ports and places
in different states and territories, in which class the Erie fell.75 The
majority thus voted for full admiralty jurisdiction over the canal.
Three dissenters voted for merely limited jurisdiction and were for
denying it in the very case which involved a repair bill on a vessel
designed and used for mere local traffic within the state. In 1932 the
New York Barge Canal was navigable waters within the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction without more than passing comment.76
In the Parsons case, the whole court agreed that it was "not in-
tended to intimate that if the waters though navigable are wholly
territorial and used only for local traffic, such for instance, as the
interior lakes of the State of New York, they are to be considered as
navigable waters of the United States".1 7 This had already been de-
cided in The Mantellod8 in 1874. In 189o in Stapp v. Steamboat
Clyde" the Minnesota court upheld a state statute similar to that of
New York in the Parsons case in a litigation which arose out of sup-
plies delivered to a steamboat navigating Lake Minnetonka, an inland
lake lying wholly within the limits of Minnesota.
So far "navigable waters" have been defined merely in terms of
geography. There remains for discussion the question of what is meant
"
2Judge Brown cited The Avon, i Brown's Ad. 17o, Fed. Cas. 680 (1873) in
which Judge Emmons took jurisdiction of a collision happening upon the Welland
Canal, as the earliest with the exception of Scott v. Young American, Newberry's
Ad. 1ol (1856), of the canal cases in this country. But he added the doctrine was
"no novelty in England". 7Suprawnote 69.
74In White Oak Transporation Co. v. Boston, Cape Cod & New York Canal Co.,
258 U. S. 341, 42 Sup. Ct. 338, 66 L. ed. 649 (1922) a steamer ran ashore on the
south bank of the Cape Cod Canal and later sank diagonally across it. The canal
company libelled the ship which cross libelled the canal company. No question is
made of the jurisdiction in admiralty.
"The R. W. Parsons, supra note 71, at p. 28; "...the Erie Canal though
wholly within the state of New York, is a great highway of commerce between
parts in different states, and foreign countries. . ." The canal was built with
New York money but the item received no comment and is obviously immaterial.
"Marine Transit Co. v. Dryfus, 284 U. S. 263, 272, 52 Sup. Ct. 166, 76 L. ed.
282 (1932).
"7Such of them however which connect with the New York Barge (Erie)
Canal are within the admiralty jurisdiction. Cf. Ex parte Wheeler, i F. Supp. 4o2
(E. D. N. Y. 1932), involving an explosion on board a small vessel while lying in
Cayuga Inlet at the southern end of Lake Cayuga.
7878 U. S. 430, 441, 442. 7943 Minn. 192, 45 N. W. 46o.
66 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
by "navigable'. in. respect to capacity - to bear floating vehicles. If
stated in terms of the steamship Leviathan's forty foot draft, or the
Queen Mary's, few harbors are "navigable". In terms of canoe traffic
a vastly different answer is got from that when "navigability" is stated
in terms of canal-boat traffic. Yet navigability is a "question of fact",
the courts say. In the definition of navigability one thing is clear how-
ever: the rules of the local state law are not controlling. "Navigability
when asserted as the basis of a right arising under the Constitution
of the United States, is necessarily a question of federal law to be
determined according to the general- rule recognized and applied in
the federal courts".8 In making the rulings on navigability, these
courts, however, are not always dealing with admiralty matters. Fre-
quently they have before them questions of proprietary rights in rivers
or their beds, or questions involving the Federal Government's inter-
state commerce interest in respect to dams and bridges on and over
waterways. But on what constitutes navigability, the cases are inter-
changeably cited with the admiralty cases. In United States v. Holt
Bank,81 a suit to quiet title to the bed of a drained lake, Van Devanter,
J. said "The rule lon since approved by this Court in applying the
constitution and laws of the United States is that streams or lakes
which are navigable in fact, must be regarded as navigable in law: that
they are navigable in fact when -they are used or are susceptible of
being used in their natural and ordinary condition as highways for
commerce over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in
the customary modes of trade and travel on water; and further that
navigability does not depend on the particular mode in which such
use is or may be had-whether by steamboats, sailing vessels, or flat
boats, nor on an absence of occasional difficulties in navigation but on
the fact, if it be a' fact, that the strean in its natural and ordinary
condition affords a channel for u~eful commerce. The Montello, 2o
Wall. 430, 439; U. S. v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316; Economy Light and
Power Co. v,. United States, 256 U., S. 113, I2I; Oklahoma z. Texr-
as, 258 U. S. 574, 586; Brewer Elliott Oil and Gas Co. v. U. S., 26o
U. S. 77, 87."
This formula, which is really that of the Daniel Ball8 2 an admiralty
jurisdiction case, makes it necessary to bring before the court the
history and characteristics of the particular stream. This is shown by
such cases as The Montello in which the United States libelled the
Montello for not having the license required by a Federal statuteP3
'OU. S. v. Holt Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 55, 46 Sup. Ct. 197, 7o L. ed. 465 (1926).
8tSupranote 8o. 8'IO Wall. 557, 77'U. S. 557 (1870).
83Act of July 7, 1838, 5 STAT. 304.
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of vessels operating upon "the navigable waters of the United States."
The steamer was used solely on the Fox River in Wisconsin and
although Mr. Justice Field remarked84 "We are supposed to know
judicially the principal features of the geography of our country, and
as part of it, what streams are public navigable waters of the United
States", he added that the court's researches toward making the fiction
a reality left them in doubt. He remanded the cause for further pro-
ceedings saying "the parties will be able to present by new allegations
and evidence, the precise character of Fox River as a navigable
stream". Four years later, the case was again before the court.85 In
an opinion which illustrates the technique of decision on navigability,
Mr. Justice Davis for the court then held the Fox River to be navi-
gable and the Montello subject to the regulation. He went into an
elaborate discussion of the history of the voyages of Marquette and
Joliet, the explorers, over the Fox River and its portage by which
the traders went from the Great Lakes to the Mississippi by aid of
specially constructed boats from which their crews often jumped
overboard and pushed in the shallow water. Notwithstanding the
portages the court said the river was "navigable" even before a canal
replaced the portages. "It has always been navigable in fact, and not
only capable of use but actually used."
Obviously no Leviathan ran on Fox Ri-er but it was usable by the
special craft adapted for it. In casting the test of navigability in terms
of the craft, little was said about them except that "Vessels of any
kind that can float upon the water whether propelled by animal power
or by the wind, or by the agency of steam are or may become the
mode by which a vast commerce may be conducted and it would be
a mischievous rule that would exclude either in determining the navi-
gability."' 6 Yet Justice Davis agreed that not every small creek in
which a fishing skiff or gunning canoe can be made to float is navi-
gable, and the court added "it must be generally and commonly useful
for some purpose of trade and agriculture."8 7 In Leovy v. United
Statess8 the Montello case, which is constantly referred to, was in-
voked in the damming of a stream which the Government asserted
was navigable. The court held it was not navigable merely because it
could float "a skiff or small lugger" and discharged into an interstate
stream. As the competing interest was that the dam was erected by a
public official acting on a program of swamp reclamation, the decision
s'78 U. S. 471, 414. (1870).
nThe Montello, 87 U. S. 430 (1874). 86Ibid. at 442.
STThe opinion quoted from Chief Justice Shaw in Rowe v. Bridge Corp., 21
Pick. 344 (1838). ss177 U. S. 621, 631 (igoo).
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may have less significance in a question of admixalty jurisdiction.
Economy Light Co. v. United Statess9 which concerned a dam also,
involved the navigability of the Desplaines River, a link, like the Fox
River, in a pre-Revolutionary portage route from the Lakes to the
Mississippi which had been disused since about 1825 when the fur
trade fell off. Yet despite rapids, shallow water, boulders and ob-
structions, the Circuit Court of Appeals held the river to be navigable
and the Supreme Court agreed 90 saying that the lower court had
"correctly applied the test laid down by this court in the Daniel Ball,
1O Wall. 557, 563: and the Montello, 20 Wall. 430, 440-443" which
the court reviewed.
These cases also establish what might be called an indelible navi-
gability. For in the Economy Light cases the court added91 that "a
river having actual navigable capacity in its natural state9 2 and capable
of carrying commerce between the states is within the power of Con-
gress to preserve for future transportation even though it be not at
present used for such commerce, and be incapable of such use accord-
ing to present methods either by reason of changed conditions or be-
cause of artificial obstructions". In addition to the title-quieting case
of United States v. Holt State Bank,93 the Supreme Court had before
it, on the topic in 1931, United States v. Utah94 which concerned the
navigability of various rivers in Utah. The decision leads one to be-
lieve that navigability is not a matter of the whole stream. A part may
be non-navigable. Nor is the actual fact of present navigation or lack
of it so much as its susceptibility of use the test which determines the
stream's character. The court quoted the Montello that "the capability
of use by the public.., affords the true criterion of the navigability
of a river rather than the extent and manner of that use."
From the foregoing it will appear that the navigability test is not
clearly stated in terms of current, depth of water or in terms of the
craft. The possibility that a riverway is "navigable" by "rafts of lum-
ber" was accepted by Judge Davis in the Montello.
It should not be assumed from this discussion of "navigable waters
of the United States" that only domestic waters fall within the ad-
miralty scope of "jurisdiction", at least in the court-competency sense
of that word. The reader is warned that the series of cases just dis-
89256 U. S. 113 (1921). 9°Ibid. at 121. 91.TW. at 123.
92The constant use of this phrase "natural state" is curious in view of canal
cases, supra notes 71, 72.
"Supra note 80.
4283 U. S. 64 (i93I). At p. 75 the court pointed out that the title to the beds
of navigable streams passed to Utah on its admission while the bed of those then
non-navigable remain in the U. S.
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cussed are really but part of the adjustment of our state and federal
set up, which furnishes so many maritime jurisdiction problems. The
cases cited have concerned inland waters over which the United States
government is sovereign in every international sense. But waters of
the high seas in the sense that they are non-territorial to any sover-
eign are most certainly admiralty waters of the United States95 in the
sense that our courts apply the general admiralty corpus in dealing
with events which occur upon them. So also are waters within the
territorial sovereignty of a foreign power. Our courts have jurisdic-
tion, in the sense of court-competency at least, of cases involving
events in either type of these non-American waters, though, as will
be seen later, the precise character of the general admiralty corpus
which our courts apply in these Cases is not necessarily the same as
the version of it which governs in our own waters. In The Avon,"8
jurisdiction was taken of a collision which occurred upon the Welland
Canal in Canada. As early as 1843 in Smith v. Condry,97 the Supreme
Court took jurisdiction of a collision which occurred in the port of
Liverpool. In Panama Railroad Co. v. Napier Shipping Co.,98 the
ship's injury was sustained in a foreign port but she filed a libel in
the United States courts.9 9 Said Mr. Justice Brown: "The fact that
the cause of action arose in the waters of a foreign port is immaterial.
While in some cases it is said that a court of admiralty has jurisdic-
tion 'of all torts arising upon the high seas, or upon navigable waters
of the United States, The Commerce, i Black. 574; Holmes v. 0.
and C. Railroad, 5 Fed. Rep. 75; The Glatsop Chief, 8 Fed. Rep. 767,
the connection in which those words are found indicate that they
were not used restrictively; and the law is entirely well settled both
in England and in this country, that torts originating within the wa-
ters of a foreign power may be the subject of a suit in a domestic
court."' ° More recently in Royal Mail and P. Co. v. Lloyd Braai-
liero,'0 ' our admiralty court took jurisdiction of a collision in Belgian
territorial waters between an English and a Brazilian ship, while in
Galef v. United States0 2 the collision took place in the Harbor of
Hamburg.
IsThe question of what law to apply is discussed by the author in an article in
(1930) 44 HARV. L. REv. 232. See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §4o4 et seg.;
RESTATEMENT. CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4o4 ef seq.
'
5Brown's Adm. 170, 2 Fed. Cas. 255 (N. D. Ohio, 1873). The opinion fully
reviews the authorities to its date.
97I How. 28. 98166 U. S. 28o, (1896).
9"The ship was British but the defendant was a New York corporation.
100166 U. S. 285. 10127 F. (2d) OO2 (E. D. N. Y. 1928).
10'25 F. (2d) 134 (D. C. S. C. 1928).
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III
TE VESSEL
Merely because events occur upon navigable waters does not put
them within the admiralty. Transactions, whether torts or contracts,
occurring on these waters, are "maritime" only when in some way
connected with a "vessel". On the tort side it is one of the stock il-
lustrations that a collision betveen two houses torn loose from their
foundations in a flood and floating on a river is not within the ad-
miralty jurisdiction. But "vessels in navigable waters are within the
jurisdiction of the admiralty."' 03
Since 1866 Congress has declared that "The word 'vessel' includes
every description of water craft or other artificial contrivance used,
or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water" :104
and this definition is in a context giving general provisions for the
construction of "any act of Congress". Yet the section has not relieved
the courts of the burden of deciding when the thing in question is a
"vessel" within the general admiralty jurisdiction. The topic has a
dependency upon the waters. "If it be once conceded ... that navi-
gable canals used as highways for interstate or foreign commerce are
navigable waters of the United States, it would be an anomaly to hold
that such jurisdiction did not attach to the only craft navigating such
canals." This is from the opinion in the Robert W. Parsons.105
In the Robert' W. Parsons, already noticed on the point that the Erie
Canal was navigable water within the admiralty jurisdiction, the Su-
preme Court stated'0 6 that the "crucial question" was "whether the
exclusive' 0 7 admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts
attaches to canal boats-in other words, whether they are ships or
Whether our courts will take jurisdiction of a case involving foreigners depends
largely upon whether the latter have a common forum: see The Troop, 118 Fed.
769 (1902), aft'd 128 Fed. 856 (C. C. A. 9th, 19o9) and Coffey, Jurisdiction over
Foreigners in Admiralty Courts (1925) CALIF. L. REv. 93. The last two cases
cited in the text applied our American Limitation of Liability Act in the Belgian
collision and our American division of damage rule in the German one. This
Galef case is sharply questioned in a note (1929) 27 MICH. L. REv. 2o6 which
argues that by ordinary conflict of laws rules lex loci deleci-Hamburg-should
govern. The Belgian collision case is noted (1929) 41 HARv. L. Ry-. 434; (1929)
77 U. oF PA. L. REV. 406.
103Cardozo, J. in Reinhard v. Newport Corporation, 232 N. Y. 115, 133 N. E.
371, 18 A. L. R. 1324 (1921).
10414 STAT. 1866, U. S. Comp. St. (1916) §3, x. U. S. C. A. §3.
105Supra note 71, at 29. 106191 U. S. 28.
107Exclusive in the sense that jurisdiction in rem was meant. The case arose
on a New York statute giving an in rem action for repairs.
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vessels within the meaning of the admiralty law." The argument that
because the boat was horse drawn it could not be a vessel, the court
rejected as appealing "less to the reason than to the imagination". It
held the boat to be within the admiralty, saying: "In fact, neither
size, form, equipment or means of propulsion are determinative fac-
tors upon the question of jurisdiction, which regards only the purpose
for which the craft was constructed and the business in which it is
engaged."10 8 Concerning mere size, the Supreme Court continued:
"So far as the Congress of the United States have incidentally spoken
upon the subject, they have fixed a criterion of size as to what shall
be considered a vessel within the admiralty jurisdiction far below the
tonnage of an ordinary canal boat. By the original Judiciary Act of
1789, section nine, I Stat. 73, c. 2o, jurisdiction was given to the
District Courts of all seizures made on waters which'are navigable
from the sea by vessels of ten tons or more burthen; and by the act
of February 26, 1845, 5 Stat. c. 20, 726 (now obsolete), The Eagle,
8 Wall. 15, admiralty jurisdiction was given to vessels navigating the
Great Lakes and their connecting waters of twenty tons burthen and
upwards. By section 4311, Rev. Stat., vessels of twenty tons and up-
wards, enrolled and licensed, and vessels of less than twenty tons, not
enrolled and licensed, shall be deemed vessels of the United States;
and by section 4520 all vessels of fifty tons or upwards are required
to ship their seamen under written articles." This extract shows that
Congress has frequently defined "vessel", especially, and for the ap-
plication of this or that particular statute. Thus general expressions
often afford but little clue to the actual handling of the problems
which the courts solve by making a definition of "vessel". "What is
a vessel ?" has not been answered in such a fashion that the answer in
one instance is applicable to all others; and as the cases go "a vessel"
for one purpose is not a vessel for another purpose. Furthermore
many of the decisions are interpretations of "vessel" or a kindred
word as used in a statute; and the word is given a connotation merely
in the light of the special purposes of the enactment.'(* There may be
a variable between the treatment of the same structure for contract
108191 U. S. 3o . The court added: "The application of this criterion has ruled
out the floating dry dock, the floating wharf, the sailor's Bethel moored to a
wharf .... But it has been held... to include... in America... steamers of
five tons burthen, engaged in carrying freight and passengers on navigable waters.
The Pioneer, 21 Fed. Rep. 426; The Ella B., 24 Fed. 5o8; a barge without sails
or rudder used for transporting grain, The Wilmington, 48 Fed. Rep. 566; a
floating elevator, The Hezekiah Baldwin, 8 Ben. 556."
1"9See a note (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 415, where this is brought out with illustra-
tions.
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jurisdiction and, for tort jurisdiction. The status of an incomplete
structure which when completed will unquestionably be a vessel is an
illustration. For contract purposes it is no vessel. No maritime flavor
attaches to a contract for work done on the fabric even after it is
launched into the water. The Supreme Court held in The Francis
McDonald'" that no maritime lien arose in favor of a builder who
completed a ship after her launching by a prior builder who. failed to
finish her.
Yet in Tucker v. Alexandroff"' for a non-admiralty purpose the
same court had said that the launching made the structure a "ship".
For admiralty jurisdiction in tort moreover, the launching made it so
far a vessel that the injury of a workman on board a newly launched
ship was specifically stated to be within the admiralty jurisdiction in
Grant Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode." 2 Just when a newly built ship
becomes a "vessel".for contract jurisdiction in admiralty is not stated
by the Supreme Court in the Francis McDonald.113 It merely held
the contract in question not to be maritime. But the facts show the
launched and incomplete hull was towed from the yard of the original
builder in New London, Conn. to that of the libellant in New Jersey.
Had it had adventures during the. tow or had the towing company
n0Thames Towboat Co. v. Schr. Francis McDonald, -254 U. S. 242, 41 Sup. Ct.
65,65 L. ed. 245 (1920); (1921) 21 COL. L. REV. 281.
111183 U. S. 424, 22 Sup. Ct. 195, 46 L. ed. 264 (1902): a vessel when launched
was a ship within the meaning of a treaty by which the United States engaged
to apprehend deserters from a ship. The decision is now confined to its precise
facts.
112257 U. S. 469, 42 Sup. Ct. I57, 66 L. ed. 321, 25 A. L. R. ioo8 (1922). The
case went off in favor of applying a state compensation act but only on the ground
that it was a "local" matter and the workman's right to damages in admiralty
was abrogated by the state act. See also Hoof v. Pacific American Fisheries, 279
Fed. 367 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922) also holding that injury on an incomplete but
floating ship was within the admiralty jurisdiction.
In Taylor v. Lawson, 6o F. (2d) 3[65 (E. D. S. C. 1932) it was held that a man
injured on an uncompleted vessel while building was under the Longshoreman's
Act. (1933) 46 HARV. L. REV. 711, is critical, but the case rests itself squarely
upon the Rhode decision. The decision however was reversed in 64 F. (2d) 521
(C. C. A. 4th, 1933). The court said that the work not being maritime the
state act could apply. Certiorari was denied in 29o U. S. 639, 54 Sup. Ct. 56,
78 L. ed. 555 (1933).
11 The court worded its question "Was appellant's contract to furnish materials,
work, and labor for her completion, made after the schooner was launched but
while not sufficiently advanced to discharge the functions for which intended within
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction? The District Court thought not and so
do we". The italicized lines may give some clue to the question in the text. The
court also describes her as not "in condition to carry on any service" when re-
ceived by the libellant.
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raised a question of maritime lien for its services the jurisdiction
problem would have been raised in an embarrassing form. As Judge
Hough commented, 114 "She was enough of a ship for (towing), and
doubtless could have incurred a maritime lien for collision en route,
but was not sufficiently a vessel to be liable for her own finishing."
New Bedford Dry Dock Co. v. Purdy Claiant of the "Jack O'Lah-
tern"" involved merely the question whether the libellant's work
metamorphosing a carfloat into a floating dance hall was a job of ship
construction or a job of ship repair. If a repair job it was of course a
maritime contract: the authorities agree on that. The court held the
particular contract to be a repair undertaking and consequently mari-
time. The same sort of amvsement vessel was involved in litigation in
The Showboat' 6 concerning the character of the contracts of those
who furnished tables, chairs, piano, dishes, etc. The court held her to
be a vessel: and the opinion is a valuable summary of the cases al-
though it shows a recent case contra to its holding that an anchored
show boat is a vessel."17 The court added: "We are not disposed to
enlarge the compass of the rule" of the McDonald case classing new
ship construction contracts as non-maritime. The Jack O'Lantern
while the rebuilder worked on her structure was already a vessel, not
merely a mass of material to be shaped into a ship. In these ship con-
struction cases the intention of the owner not to use the ship in her
uncompleted state is obvious if the intent for use is an adequate test.
The intent for use test furnishes some clue to the present status of a
structure which concededly has been a vessel and may even again be
such but is now being put to some special use. Old vessels are often
cheaply bought for use as hotels, for dance halls, for show boats and
recently for what the moving picture people called a "prop"."18 The
U4In Admiralty Jurisdiction-Of Late Years (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 529,534.
m2 58 U. S. 96, 42 Sup. Ct. 243, 66 L. ed. 482 (1922). Cf. Blatchford, J. in the
Hendrick Hudson, Fed. Cas. No. 6355. He denied a salvage recovery for aid to a
hulk, floating and towable but used as a hotel saying "The service did not fairly
and legitimately concern any right or duty which appertained to commerce or
navigation or, to structure engaged in commerce or navigation. Whether the
structure in question would or would not be liable in rem, in the admiralty, for
a tort or injury committed on navigable waters depends on different considera-
tions..." i i Fed. Cas. io86 (1869). n64 7 F. (2d) 286 (D. C. Mass. 1930).
nHayford v. Doussony, 32 F. (2d) 605 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929). The court felt that
the Evansville-Chero Cola Case, infra note 127, governed.
UsSee "Old Ironsides"--The Llewellyn J. Morse, 25 F. (2d) 973 (D. C. Cal.
1928). The old vessel was used in making the picture called "Old Ironsides".
Men were hurt, and the question arose in respect to a limitation of liability
available to a "vessel". Her status was inferentially not that of a vessel but
limitation was denied on another ground.
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Hendrick Hudson19 laid down the working principles as early as
1869. An old steamboat, stripped of its boilers, engines, paddle wheels
and in service as a saloon and hotel grounded while being towed from
one location to another, and was assisted by the libellant who sought
a salvage award. In denying it, Judge Blatchford1 20 said: "Although
this hulk or structure had once been a vessel in the full sense of the
term... and although its form and shape under water continued to
be those of a vessel... This hulk was not in any proper sense engaged
in commerce or navigation.'
12 1
Judge Blatchford was in the Supreme Court when that tribunal
decided Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co.122 also a salvage case, in which
the Court denied jurisdiction because the drydock saved was not a
"vessel". An oblong box with a flat bottom and perpendicular sides,
it was moored but sparred off from the river bank on the Mississippi,
and sunken to let vessels in, and then pumped out to raise them out
of water. It had no propulsive apparatus. "It was not designed for
navigation and could not be practically used therefor." It was also
"permanently moored"' 23 but on this occasion had broken its moor-
ings. Said the court: "A fixed structure such as this drydock is, not
used for the purpose of navigation is not a subject of salvage service
. .. The fact that it floats on the water does not make it a ship or a
vessel, and no structure that is not a ship or a vessel is a subject of
salvage." Thus specifically the Vallette case is a decision on what may
be the subject of salvage. But it has constantly been referred to on
the general question of what is a vessel.
Whether the dry dock was not a vessel because it was permanently
moored or because it was not designed for navigation has been the
subject of some comment. In a case discussing general jurisdiction,
Judge Rellstab in Bertom v. Tietien and Lang Dry Dock C0.124 re-
viewed the cases and remarked :125 "In the Vallette Dry Dock Case
the phrase 'permanently moored' though appearing in the head note
and used in the opinion, can hardly be said to have been employed as
controlling the distinction between what was and what was not a
vessel within the meaning of the admiralty law." He went on to say
.that "not mere ability to float constitutes a vessel but the purpose of
being used, or the actual use in navigation as a means of transporta-
tion, are the essential requirements." A libel for injury, by a ship, to
a floating dry dock was, however, sustained in United States v. Bruce
n9i Fied. Cas. iO85, Fed. Cas. No. 6355, 3 Ben. 419 (1869).
12OAfterward Mr. justice Blatchford. '12I I Fed. Cas. io86.
2lI9 U. S. 625, 7 Sup. Ct. 342, 3oL. ed. 532 (1887).
'luiI9 U. S. 627.
129 Fed. 763 (D. C. N. J. 1915). "'Tbid. at 773.
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Dry Dock Co.126 Said the court: "In our opinion the cause of action
... was within the admiralty jurisdiction since the tort complained of
was maritime in its nature and accrued in navigable water. A floating
dry dock is used exclusively for the repair of ships. It has no connec-
tion with commerce on land."
In Evansville and Bowling Green Packet Co, v. Chero Cola Bottling
Co.12 7 in 1926, the precise question was whether or not the statute
limiting liability to the value of the "vessel"' 28 applied to a wharf
boat 20 used to transfer freight between steamboats and the land and
from one boat to another. The Supreme Court's decision that it was
not a vessel is noticeably influenced by its reading of the purposes of
the particular statute. But it cites the Vallette and the Parsons cases
and confirms the view that the use at the occasion determines the
status of the structure as a "vessel" rather than any permanent defi-
nition of vessel. The wharf boat here in question could have been used
as a scow and if so used would have been a vessel within the scow
165 F. (2d) 938 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
127271 U. S. 19, 46 Sup. Ct. 379, 70 L. ed. 805 (1926), noted in (1927) 36 YALE
L.J. 415.
128The act provided that under certain conditions the liability of the owner of a
vessel should not exceed the value of his interest in the vessel. The history and
policy of the statute is set out in (1935) 35 COL. L. R v. 246. At p. 264 the writer
sets out a bill for modification of the limitation. This passed during the summer of
1935: see the amendment of August 29, 1935 to R. S., §4283, 46 U. S, C. A. §183.
It now provides that the total liability of the owner, etc. "for the entire loss of
life or personal injuries caused without the fault or privity of such owner...
shall be in amount not less than an amount equal to $6o for each ton of tonnage
.. "or the owner's interest if it be a greater amount. See 1935 A. M. C. r261 and
J. B. Purdy, The Recent Amendments to the Maritime Limitatiom of Liability
Statutes (935) 5 BROOKLYN L. REv. 42.
29The boat which was over forty years old had been towed from Arkansas to
Indiana to Kentucky to Indiana again. It was 243 feet long, 48 wide, 6 deep; of
wood with a side sheathing of concrete. At the time of the occurrences litigated
it was secured to the shore with four or five cables and merely moved up and down
the levee with the stages of the river. It had no motive power and it had connec-
tion with the city's water and electric and telephone systems. In Hayford v.
Doussony, 32 F. (2d) 605 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929) the "Pirate Ship" was secured to
the dock, not like an ordinary ship, but with cables and clamps, the cables having
eight or ten turns around clusters of piling. A permanent gangway was built
ashore with a house over it extending to the wharf. Electric wires and waterpipes
connected the structure with the shore. The structure was used only as a dance
platform. The court considered that the Evansville case governed. In The Show-
boat, 47 F. (2d) 286 (193o), the Massachusetts District Court felt that as the
mooring was less permanent and the wiring easily detachable the pleasure boat
was a "vessel."
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cases, of which there are many.130 At the time, however, it was actual-
ly a shore structure so far as its use was concerned.
A scow moored and used to store oars and sails of small boats land-
ing at it and as a means of agress to a wharf and thence ashore was
held not to be a vessel' 31 because stationary and never employed in
transportation. So too a floating structure permanently so moored
that dump carts could run over it to a boat, was not a vessel' 3 2 but
"By its nature, build, design and use it belongs to that considerable
class of cases such as dry docks, floating saloons, bath houses, floating
hotels, floating boathouses, and floating bridges, all of which have
been held not to be vessels within the maritime law". These same
"scows" if used in transportation would however be vessels when so
used; in The Sunbeam'3 3 "The Sunbeam was a scow engaged in
carrying stone about the harbor of New York and unloading its car-
goes and similar cargoes from other scows at places where sea walls
were being built." A raft has been held to be a "vessel" for maritime
lien for collision ;134 but a raft was not a vessel when a seaman libelled
in rem for wages.'33 More recently, however, the Supreme Court held
a contract to tow a raft within the admiralty jurisdiction. In Knapp
Stout Co. v. McCaffrey, 3 6 Brown, J. said "That a contract to tow
another vessel is a, maritime contract, is too clear for argument, and
there is no distinction in principle between a vessel and a raft". Yet
though a raft is a vessel for this purpose he added "whether the per-
formance of such a contract gives a lien upon the raft for the towage
bill admits of more doubt: indeed the authorities as to how far a raft
is within the jurisdiction of admiralty are in hopeless confusion, but
for the purpose of this case we may admit such lien exists."
In recent years the question of what is a vessel has been embar-
rassed by the advent of new types of structures. In New York a work-
man was hurt while caring for an anchored hydroplane of his em-
ployer which he waded out to turn around. If he were injured by a
vessel, the jurisdiction of the admiralty would exclude that of the
State Compensation Board. In Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service
Corporation,3 7 Cardozo, J. for the court held that "the craft, though
13 Charles Barnes Co. v. One Dredge Boat, 169 Fed. 895 ( E. D. Ky. 1909),
lists many cases of scows.
'3Woodruff v. One Covered:Scow, 30 Fed. 269 (E. D. N. Y. 1887).132Ruddiman v. A Scow Platform, 38 Fed. x58 (S. D. N. Y. 1889).
m3195 U. S. 468 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912).
13Seabrook v. A Raft, 4o Fed. 596 (D. C. S. C. 1889).
13nRaft of Cypress Logs, Fed. Cas. No. 11527 (W. D. Tenn. 1876).
"8177 U. S. 638, 20 Sup. Ct. 824, 44L. ed. 921 (1900).
137232 N. Y. 115, 133 N. E. 371; 18 A. L. R. 1324 (3921). The case was noted
(1921) io CALiF. L. REV. 232; (1922) 22 COL. L. REV. 272; (1922) 31 YALE L. J.
437.
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new, is subject, while afloat to the tribunals of the sea. Any structure
used or capable of being used for transportation on water is a vessel."
And he added that all that remained was "to ascertain the uses and
capacities of the structure to be classified". He concluded "A hydro-
plane, while afloat, upon waters capable of navigation is subject to the
admiralty because location and function stamp it as a means of water
transportation. Such a plane is indeed two things-a sea-plane and an
aeroplane. To the extent that it is the latter, it is not a vessel for the
medium through which it-travels is the air 138 Crawford Bros. No. 2
supra.1" 9 To the extent that it is the former, it is a vessel, for the
medium through which it travels is the water." A recent English
decision, Watson v. R. C. A. Victor Co.,140 dealt with the case of a
sea-plane whose S. 0. S. message was picked up by Watson's trawler
while the latter was off Greenland. Watson searched the area stated
by the S. 0. S. as the sea-plane's position and finally located it "on
a rocky isle surrounded by the ice-pack," where it had foundered.
The passengers and crew were able to scramble ashore with equip-
ment worth £3000 which Watson saved. "Can a sea-plane be re-
garded as in the nature of a ship or vessel so as to bring it and its
cargo within the law relating to salvage at sea ?" asked the court. It
answered: No.
As the subject of admiralty jurisdiction, a "vessel" is the most
obvious structure connected with commerce and navigation and so
far the discussion has dealt only with what may or may not be a "ves-
sel". A series of recent decisions however have enlarged at least on
the tort side the list of structures over which the jurisdiction extends.
The background for this lies in our American doctrine that while.
injury to a ship--even by a shore structure-' 41 is within the ad-
1
'
5W. W. Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws (1933)"42 YALE
L. J. 333, at 338 remarks that "In his opinion Cardozo, J. apparently assumes that
there is a single definition of 'vessel' for all purposes of admiralty law, and thus
by a process of what fairly may be called 'mechanical jurisprudence' reaches his
conclusion". Cook also remarks that under the decision "We thus have the some-
what curious result that the crew are entitled to compensation under the state
compensation law for injuries received while the plane is 'in the air' but not for
those which occur while the plane is 'on the water'."
13'215 Fed. 269 (W. D. Wash. 19r4), noted (1914) 28 HARv. L. REV. 200. It
held that no maritime lien arose on the repair of an aeroplane.
14 Aberdeen Sheriff's Court, 5o L. T. R. 77 (I934), reported also in 1935 A. M.
C. 1251.
lu0n admiralty jurisdiction for claims arising out of injuries to vessels by land
structures see Dorrington v. Detroit 223 Fed. 232 (C. C. A. 6th, I915); Green-
wood v. Westport, 53 Fed. 824 (D. C. Conn. 1893), cases of negligent operation
of bridges; Stevens v. Western Union Tel. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 13371 (E. D. N. Y.
1876), negligently located cable entangling the propeller. See for a more recent
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miralty, the mere fact that the injury complained of is by a ship does
not of itself make the cause of action maritime. In England the rule
is otherwise. 142
In our American admiralty law, it follows that injury by a vessel
to a shore structure furnishes the latter with no maritime cause of
action. A familiar instance is that of a bridge smashed by a vessel.
In such a case the bridge owner has no maritime remedy.143 "As the
bridge was essentially a land structure, maintained and used as an aid
to commerce on land, its locality and character were such that the
tort was non-maritime." But if injury by a ship is not the test of
jurisdiction here neither is the test merely that of injury to a ship,
for the category has been made to include other structures than ves-
sels. Recent decisions hold that even if the thing injured by a ship is
on land, if it is an aid to navigation a maritime remedy may be had
against the ship. In The Blackheath,144 a libel in rem was filed against
a British vessel which had wrecked a channel light. "The beacon stood
fifteen or twenty feet from the channel of Mobile River or Bay, in
water 12 or 15 feet deep, and was built on piles firmly driven into the
bottom." The court conceded that it was part of the realty, but never-
theless held that there was admiralty jurisdiction. Justice Holmes for
the court said that it was an injury to a government aid to navigation-
"only technically land" and purported to "distinguish" the older cases.
justice Brown, 4 5 who concurred in the result, denied the distinctions
saying "I accept this case as practically overruling the former ones
and as recognizing the principle adopted by the English Admiralty
Court Jurisdiction Act of 1861 (sec. 7) extending the jurisdiction...
to 'any claim for damages done by any ship' ". Justice Brown's view
case Burke v. So. Bell Tel. Co., 42 F. (2d), 742 (D. C. Ala. 1930), injury to vessel's
stack by low-hanging wire, noted (I931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 460.
14See a note (1929) 42 HARV. L. REV. 563 which shows that in England and on
the continent the damage done by a vessel is within the jurisdiction and sets
forth a proposed act for an extension of jurisdiction to injuries by ships to land
structures. See J. M. Stinson, Admiralty Jurisdiction of the courts of Great Britain,
France and the United States (1 9 2I),I6 ILL. L. Rzv. io; and a note to Cleveland
etc. R. R. Co. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 2o8 U. S. 316,28 Sup. Ct. 414, 52 L. ed. 508
(1907) in (1908) 21 HARV. L., REv. 536.
14Martin v. West, 222 U. S. I9I (I9II). See The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361
(1904).
14195 U. S. 361, 25 Sup. Ct. 46, 49 L. ed. 236 (i9o4).
14 See C. M. Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction of Late Years (1924) 37 HARv. L.
REV. 529 foran appreciation of H. B. Brown as an admiralty lawyer. "He ended
the line that began with Story and embodied the admiralty tradition."
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has not prevailed however, 146 and in The Raithnwor 47 Holmes, J.
reaffirmed the Blaclheath, decision on its narrower ground. The bea-
con which the Raithmoor injured was incomplete at the time of the
collision but Holmes, J. denied that this fact had any bearing on the
jurisdiction. He asserted that its incompleteness made no difference
in the jurisdiction. "We regard the location and purpose of the struc-
ture as controlling from the time the structure was begun", he said;
and decided that its "locality and design gave it a distinctly maritime
relation".
Thus a new line of catchwords has been developed and the simple
statement that maritime jurisdiction does not extend to injury to
any "land" structures cannot be made. Yet it can scarcely be said to
extend to any land structure which is in aid of navigation. In The
Panoi148 although the dike hit by the steamer was built by the United
States government in aid of navigation the court said that so far as
maritime jurisdiction was concerned: "We think the principle of those
cases (Blackheath, Raithinoor) does not go so far". This dike in the
Panoil case was submerged in navigable waters. Extending 70o feet
at right angles to the channel it was designed "to slacken the current,
induce deposits of sediment and eventually build out the shore; and
in this way improve the channel." Although it does not appear to have
reached the shore,149 the court said it "constitutes an extension of the
shore, and must be regarded as land." On the other hand in The
City of Ellwoad,150 the private owners of a cluster of piling sued the
United States' 5 ' for injury to the piling by government vessels. In
granting jurisdiction, the court said "Although driven into the bottom
of the river and attached in that way only to the land they were com-
rain Cleveland Terminal v. Valley R. R. Co., 208 U. S. 316, 320, 28 Sup. Ct.
414, 52 L. ed. 5o8, 512, 13 Ann. Cas. 1215 (I9O8), noted (1908) 21 HARv. L. REv.
536, the court specifically repudiated Justice Brown's view and reasserted that
"bridges, shore docks, protection piling, piers, etc. (of the Cleveland Terminal Co.)
pertained to the land". The decision in The Troy, 208 U. S. 321, 28 Sup. Ct. 416
52 L. ed. 512 (1goo) was to the same effect. Judge Brown in Jurisdiction of the
Admiralty in Cases of Tort (I9O9) 9 COL. L. REv. I, 13, discusses prophetically
the embarrassments concerning wharves and piles, etc. which are entailed by the
American rule. See Judge Hough's comment (1924) 37 HARv. L. REV. 529, 531,
on how deeply Mr. justice Brown "sympathized" with the discontent of the bar
over the rule "which relegates to law redress for injuries done by a floating ship
to objects firmly affixed to land, though that land be under water."
147241 U. S. I66, 36 Sup. Ct. 514, 6o L. ed. 937, (1915); (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv.
531; (1927) 36 YALE L. J. IOI5.
148266 U. S. 4 33 , 45 Sup. Ct. 164, 69 L. ed. 366 (1924).
49 Cf. The Oskaloosa, infra note 152.
150268 U. S. 33, 45 Sup. Ct. 411, 69 L. ed. 832 (1924).
r'oUnder an act approved Mar. 9, 1920, c. 95,41 STAT. 525.
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pletely surrounded by navigable water and were used as aids to navi-
gation." The use was for mooring merely. The case may be taken
to determine that mooring piles are within the jurisdiction even though
they are privately owned. Yet the point has not been conceded in the
lower courts. 152 In so far as United States government property is
concerned recent litigation has taken a different form, and the Federal
owner has found it worth while to invoke a jurisdiction other than
the admiralty. When the steamer Gansford struck a jetty wall at the
mouth of the Mississippi, the local United States attorney proceeded
against her under the River and Harbor Act.153 In The Gansford'5
the court stated that the injury being to "a structure which is to, be
regarded as land was not cognizable in a court of admiralty"; but held
nevertheless that the libel in the law side of the court in rem against
the vessel for damages was a proper proceeding under the particular
statute invoked. 5
Whatever the difficulties of setting off the maritime structures it
is clear from the foregoing discussion that anything labelled a "land
structure" is outside the maritime jurisdiction. If it is injured its
owners cannot avail themselves of the admiralty remedies: nor invoke
them with respect to contracts concerning it. That remedy peculiar to
the admiralty of suing in rem and making the offending ship a secur-
ity for the damage is closed to them. Damage to piers and other water
front property by ships is frequent. If the vessel is under a compulsory
112In the Baron Jedburgh, 299 Fed. 960 (W. D. Wash. 1923), the court decided
that injury to private mooring posts was not within the jurisdiction. And in The
Oskaloosa 284 Fed. 978, 1923 A. M. C. 44 (E. D. La. 1921) the court had decided
that injury to mooring posts was not and the Supreme Court affirmed on memo,
26o U. S. 699,43 Sup. Ct. 91, 67 L. ed. 47o (1922).
ThAct of March 3, 1899; 30 STAT. 1152, 1153, etc., 33 U. S. C. A. §408, 411-12.
It imposes a fine for damage by a vessel to any sea wall, wharf or pier built by
the United States and imposes liability for the actual damage done enforceable
by a libel in rem in admiralty. Although the court considered that the act did not
violate on the locality rule because it was penal in nature, it would seem that the
locality test for admiralty jurisdiction applies equally to crimes as well as torts.
See 35 STAT. 142, 18 U. S. C. A. §451 (i9o9); Atlantic Trans. Co. v. Imbroveck,
234 U. S. 52, 6o (I914).
L'417 F. (2d) 613 (1927); 25 F. (2d) 736 (1928). The quotation in the text is
from the opinion in 32 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929). Certiorari was denied 280
U. S. 578, 5o Sup. Ct. 66, 74 L. ed. 587 (1929).
15Jf the structure is land so that no admiralty jurisdiction can attach, a state
might protect its wharf or pier property or indeed any private property of similar
sort by a similar statute. For if the matter in question is non-maritime, a lien
in ren may be created by a state though it must be enforced against the ship
in admiralty: see Martin v. West, 222 U. S. 191, 32 Sup. Ct. 47, 56 L. ed. 159
(19x x);and Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry Co., 237 U. S. 303, 35 Sup. Ct. 396,
59 L. ed. 966 (1914).
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pilot as is usually the case in harbors there can be no recovery in
personam' 56 against the owners although there would be a basis for
a suit in rem against the offending ship if the injury were to a ves-
sel.157 But there is no maritime jurisdiction in rem or in personam
for the owners of the land structure and there has been not a little
discontent with the present rule.Yr8 In 193o a Committee of the Mari-
time Law Association recorded that it favored the extension of ad-
miralty jurisdiction to cover damage caused to land structures by ves-
sels ;59 and in April Of that year the Committee on Admiralty of the
American Bar Association held meetings jointly with the Maritime
Law Association's Committee.
The further question of structures which are on land but are used
for maritime purposes is sharply raised concerning dry docks, par-
ticularly in instances where men have sustained injuries while repair-
ing a vessel in a drydock. In -the Anglo-Patagonian'60 maritime juris-
diction was upheld notwithstanding that the workman was injured,
not on the vessel but upon a scaffold erected on her outside. The con-
tention that the accident happened on land and was not cognizable,
the court said, rested on "no sustainable basis". Yet the dock in the
case was a hole in the ground into which the ship floated. The result
however was tacitly accepted by the Supreme Court in Gonsalves v.
Morse Dry Dock and Repair Co.161 in Justice McReynolds' remark:
"In the Robert W. Parsonvs, 191 U. S. 17, 33, this court held that re-
pairs to a vessel while in an ordinary dry dock were not made on
land". 16 2 In the Gonsalves case, the repairs were made upon the ship
while in a floating dry dock. "Clearly the accident did not occur upon
land. The doctrine followed in Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., i 9
U. S. 625, 627 that 'no structure that is not a ship or vessel is a sub-
mHomer Ramsdell Co. v. La Compagnie Genl. Transatlantique, 182 U. S.
406, 21 Sup. Ct. 831,45 L. ed. 1155 (19oi), noted (1902) xs HARV. L. REV. 405.
157The China, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. ed. 67 (x868).
'
58Ernest Bruncken, Tradition and Common Sense in Admiralty (1929) 14
MARQ. L. REV. I6, states the arguments. Mr. Bruncken is secretary of the Mil-
waukee Harbor Commission.
159Cf. its DOCUMENT No. 158 dated January 17, 193o: and its further DOCUMENT
No. 172 of May 1931.
160235 Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916). In The Warfield, 12o Fed. 847 (19o3), the
Court took a contrary view.
161266 U. S. 171,45 Sup. Ct. 39,69 L. ed. 80 (1924).
162The Anglo-Patagonian opinion based itself on The Robt. W. Parsons, supra
note 71, adding that under that case if the dry dock company had a maritime
"contract" we perceive no reason why its employees engaged in making the re-
pairs may not sue in admiralty. See G. W. Stumberg, Tort Jurisdiction in Ad-
miralty (1926) 4 TEx. L. REv. 307 at 31I, a discussion of the case.
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ject of salvage', 163 has no application. That admiralty jurisdiction in
tort matters depends upon locality is settled".6.4 The dismissal.of the
libel was reversed, Whatever limitation may be intended by the words
"ordinary dry. dock" as used in the quotation from the Robert W.
Parsons, supra, was. specifically disclaimed by the Supreme Court in
1919 in North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Ry. S. B. Co.165
when, after referring to The Parsons it said that the admiralty juris-
diction extended to repair contracts independent of whether they were
made upon a vessel "afloat, while in dry dock, or while hauled up by
ways upon land."
When the Federal Harbor Workers' and Longshoremen's Act was
enacted in 1927, the "coverage" section specifically included injury
upon "navigable waters of the United States (including dry dock)".
How far this phrasing has affected the problem is discussed at a later
point. In Taylor v. Lawson,'-" the act was declared by a District
Court to extend: to injury of a man working on a new ship put into
dry dock after,.launching, but, the District Court's view did not pre-
vail. In reversing, the Circuit Court of Appeals said: "Such work is
not maritime :in the accepted meaning of that term" citing Grant
Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode 257 U: S. 469,167 and other cases
which, it concluded, "Make it clear that a state has power to provide
compensation for' injuries suffered by a workman employed in the
construction of a vessel afloat upon navigable waters." The particular
subject of the Harborworkers' Act is, however, more fully discussed
in a subsequent chapter, dealing specifically with it and it is only
incidentally touched on here. In Norton v. Vesta Coal Co,168 a man
163The impact of the Supreme Court's more recent decisions upon the minds of
the "inferior" federal courts is seen in U. S. v. Bruce Dry Dock Co., supra note
126, which sustained a tort action in admiralty in behalf of a floating dry dock.
The court said "it has no connection with commerce on land" and cited The
Raithmoor, Gonsalves v. Morse Dry Dock Co., Doullut & W. Co. v. U. S.; adding
"Cope v. Vallete D. D. Co. is not to the contrary: it merely holds that a floating
dry dock is not a subject of salvage service, because not a ship or vessel."1 6 266 U. S. 172.
1"249 U. S. II9; 39 Sup. Ct. 221,63 L. ed. 51o (1919), noted in (1919) 32 HARV.
L. REv. 853.
'66o F. (2d) 165 (E. D. S. C. 1932), noted (1933) 46 HARv. L. REV. 711: sub
nome U. S. Casualty Co. v. Taylor 64 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933) the holding
was reversed, cert. denied, 290 U. S. 639, 54 Sup. Ct. 64o, 78 L. ed. 1485 (1933).
167Supra note 112.
16863 F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1933) cert. granted, 210 U. S. 613, 54 Sup. Ct.
60, 78 L. ed. 536 (1933). In 291 U. S. 641, 54 Sup. Ct. 376, 78 L. ed. iO89 (1934),
the court said: "Per curiam: As it appears that the government has now adopted
the coxlclusion that the decision below is correct... the writ of certiorari
herein is dismissed."
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injured while at work on a vessel which had been hauled out of water
completely by use of a marine railway was denied compensation un-
der the new act. The majority of the court said Congress meant a
"'dry dock' in the common acceptance of the term" and "we take
Congress at its word." The dissenter's reasoned opinion described the
various methods of getting at the ship's hull and stressed the language
of the act, not on "dry dock" merely but on "any" dry dock as show-
ing an intent to include all the several instrumentalities for accom-
plishing the maritime work. 6 9 .
'
6gHe concluded "Although the question whether, under the statute, the term
'any dry dock' includes a marine railway is debatable, as shown by opposite
decisions in Colonna's Shipyard v. Lowe (D. C.) 22 F. (2d) 843 and Continental
Casualty Co. v. Lawson (D. C.) 2 F. Supp. (2d) 459, and by a permissible in-
ference from the decision in North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Ry. &
Shipbuilding Co., 249 U. S. 1i9, 128, 39 Sup. Ct. 221, 63 L. ed. 510, I am of the
opinion that the judgment below, on a finding that a marine railway is not in-
cluded, should be reversed."
